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Abstract
166 countries have some kind of public old age pension.  What economic forces create and sustain old
age Social Security as a public program?  We document some of the internationally and historically
common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-
as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which are increasing functions of lifetime
earnings and not means-tested.  We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: “political”,
“efficiency” and “narrative” theories.  We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority
rational voting model (with its two versions: “the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the
poor” and the “once and for all election” model), the “time-intensive model of political competition” and
the “taxpayer protection model”.  Each of the explanations is compared with the international and
historical facts.  A companion paper explores the “efficiency” and “narrative” theories, and derives
implications of all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.
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growth of labor income without taxing that income at higher and higher rates.  This definition rules out,
for example, systems like Singapore's "Provident fund" which appears to be a fully funded system but in
fact delivers rates of return to contributors of no more than the rate of labor income growth.
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There is a lot of talk about reforming old age Social Security (hereafter SS).  Two important
questions come to mind.  First, is reforming SS desirable?  That is, will the reform improve welfare for a
significant number of people?  Answering this question is impossible without a positive theory of the
creation and evolution of SS.  For example, if we evaluate various reform proposals under the belief that
SS plays a certain role (say, if we think that SS was created to make sure that the young “save enough”
for their elder years), but in reality, SS plays another role (say, it was created to induce the elderly to
retire so their jobs could be given to more productive young workers), then we may end up adopting the
wrong reform: one which maximizes the rate of return, but keeps the elderly working!  Since any reform
evaluation implicitly assumes a positive theory of SS, our task in this paper and a companion paper is to
be explicit about the facts and about the implications of various positive theories.
The second question in evaluating reform is whether it is sustainable.  Are the most popular
proposals sustainable? In particular, is a “fully funded” system sustainable?  Is an “individual accounts”
system sustainable?  An important reason to question the sustainability of fully funded reforms is that no
SS program in history has been fully funded for any important length of time.   At the same time there are
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several SS programs which were supposed to be fully funded, but were unfunded by the political system
in short order.  Take, for example, Chile’s original SS program (Edwards 1998, p. 37), Germany’s
original program (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 1997, p. 7), one of the original French programs, the first
U.S. SS law (passed in 1935, scheduled to come into effect in 1937 and to be partially funded, but
rescinded in 1939; Miron and Weil 1997 p. 5), and Sweden’s first system (Palme and Svensson 1997, p.
11).  A number of individual accounts systems have also failed to be politically sustainable, including
those in Seychelles and Egypt (Gruat 1990, p. 416) and St. Vincent (Haanes-Olsen 1989, p. 19), the
system for the American clergy (Mulligan 1997), and some African (Gruat 1990, p. 408) and Caribbean
(Jenkins 1981, p. 633) Provident Funds.
To answer the question of whether reforms are sustainable, we also need to have a positive
theory of social security.  A good theory of SS, therefore, needs to explain not only why SS exists, but
also what are the social, economic, and political forces that create these programs, keep them in place
and allow them to grow.
The main purpose of this paper and a companion paper is to identify such a positive theory orU.S. SSA Programs (1997).
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theories of SS. This paper begins with a number of “facts” or “implications” for the design of social
security programs which, we believe, are important for distinguishing reasonable theories of SS from
unreasonable ones.  When possible, we relate those implications to available empirical evidence.  In
other cases, it remains unclear whether an implication is true of false.  But it all cases we show how an
implication helps us distinguish among the various theories.
After reviewing empirical implications, we analyze eleven positive theories of SS found in the
economics literature and explain how the implications of each theory compare with the empirical
implications documented in the first section.  In Section II of this paper, we compare the main differences
between political and efficiency theories of SS.  In Section III, we review the political theories in detail. 
In a companion paper (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b)) we discuss efficiency theories and four
additional “narrative theories” which have been mentioned in academic and popular discourse, but have
not been formalized.  Finally, the companion paper uses each of the theories to evaluate the desirability
of "reforming" pay-as-you-go SS by replacing it with a forced savings program.  Perhaps surprisingly,
those theories most consistent with the empirical regularities are those in which forced savings is a rather
undesirable policy, even in the long run.
I.  Documented and Undocumented Facts about Government Spending on the Elderly
At least 166 countries have public old age pension programs.   In some of the countries, public
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old age pensions can be dated back at least a hundred years.  Although each of the programs is unique in
many respects, they also tend to have many common features.  These common design features may help
us understand why all these countries have SS programs, what are the forces keeping them in place and
perhaps allowing them to grow over time.   This section describes those regularities, drawing on the work
of Sala-i-Martin (1996) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) and offering several new contributions. 
The regularities are listed in Tables 1 and 2 for the reader's convenience. These tables cross-tabulate the
positive theories with “implications” for, and “facts” about, SS.  Our purpose is not only to help the
reader identify the “correct” theory, but also to show which implications are more important for
distinguishing one theory from another.  We therefore make no attempt in the Tables to sort or weight
facts by how true they are, and include some “implications” which have yet to be carefully verified but
are nonetheless crucial for distinguishing among theories.  We do comment on the strength of the
evidence in each case in Section II, Section III, and in the companion paper.Those aged 75+ were exempt from the earnings test beginning in 1950, those aged 72+ exempt
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beginning in 1954, and those aged 70+ beginning in 1982 (Myers 1993 pp. 272-5).
There were no “delayed retirement credits” before 1975 (House Committee 1996, p. 31), so
5
foregoing benefits in one year did not affect the amount of benefits enjoyed in later years.
This rule may have changed in recent years since, according to SSA Programs 1997, p. 35,
6
282118 francs ($8993) could be earned in 1997 without sacrificing the pension benefit.
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I.A. Social Security Induces Retirement, with benefits being a declining (and often nonlinear) function of
elderly labor income
Nearly every SS program in the world implicitly or explicitly taxes the labor income of the
elderly (Sala-i-Martin 1996).  The main reason is that SS benefits are typically a declining - and often
nonlinear - function of labor income.  Extreme versions of this include 100% benefit reduction rates (that
is, $1 of benefits lost for each $1 earned by the beneficiary) or even complete ineligibility for anyone
with a paying job.
Consider, for example, the U.S. SS benefit formulas. Between 1939 and 1959 retirees lost all of
their SS benefit if their earnings exceeded a rather low earnings limit by even one dollar!   The 100%
4,5
tax was used somewhat less between 1960 and 1971 when a 50% benefit reduction rate was introduced
on some of the earnings above the exemption amount (Myers 1993 p. 274).  U.S. implicit tax rates are
high since 1971, although less than 100%.
More examples of 100 percent taxes in the U.S. are found in old age assistance programs prior to
the 1970s.  State administered old assistance programs typically (implicitly) taxed earnings at a 100
percent rate (Myers 1993 pp. 827, who also points out that some states administering old age assistance
exempted the first 80 dollars of monthly income).  International examples are also common: elderly
Spaniards and Belgians are not allowed to collect their government pension if they earn any labor income
at all (Boldrin et al 1997 p. 16, SSA Programs 1997 p. 330, Pestieau and Stijns 1997, p. 9 ).
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In addition to old age pensions, another quantitatively important subsidy for the elderly is
government financed health care.  These programs are typically available to all elderly regardless of the
amount or composition of their income.  However, U.S. Medicare policy has a “secondary payer”
provision which requires elderly workers to continue to purchase medical insurance from their employers
until they retire, which may act as a tax on elderly work.  Requiring government medical subsidy
beneficiaries to queue prior to receiving services may also serve to discourage work by the elderly.5
I.B.  Benefits do not depend on asset income
Although SS benefits are tightly linked to the beneficiary's labor income, in 98% of the countries
for which we have data there is no link to the beneficiary's non-labor income.  Only two of the 89
countries studied by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) have old age public pension formulas which
depend on the non-labor income of the beneficiary.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin's finding is based on analysis of benefit formulas, but there are in
principle other subtle ways benefits and asset income might be linked.  For example, the non-labor
income of the elderly could be directly taxed more (or less) heavily than the non-labor income of the
young.  We have not systematically studied foreign tax systems in this regard, but the U.S. and other
governments seem to do just the opposite by favorable tax treatment of retirement savings, and allowing
elderly taxpayers special exemptions from property and capital gains taxes.  Another example is the
taxation of SS benefits in a way that is related to asset income.  The U.S. has taxed SS benefits since
1983 (Myers, p. 147) and, because marginal tax rates vary with a taxpayer's income, the amount of that
tax has some relationship with a beneficiaries asset income.  On the other hand, the U.S. has offered
special tax exemptions to the elderly for an even longer period and the after-tax value of these exemption
increases with asset income.
Another way to (implicitly) reduce old age benefits as a function of non-labor income is to have a
special means-tested program for the elderly in addition to a public old age pension program.  The U.S.
has such a welfare program, Supplemental Security Income (formerly Old Age Assistance).  However, it
is a small program compared with SS and Medicare - the old age portion of SSI is than $20 billion, as
compared to more than $500 billion for SS and Medicare (House Committee, OMB 1998 Table 8.5). 
Medicaid is another welfare program enjoyed disproportionately by the elderly because they have a
greater demand for medical care.  However, this has been a quantitatively important program only in
recent years, and did not even exist for most of the history of SS.  Furthermore - when taken together
with the favorable tax treatment of elderly non-labor income - it is not clear that old age benefits are, on
average, reduced in an important way with elderly non-labor income.
A related question is whether SS, tax, and other government policies for the elderly are
progressive or regressive, since a tendency to tax (subsidize) asset income would tend to introduce
progressivity (regressivity) into the system.  Many studies of American SS (Burkhauser and Warlick
1981, Garrett 1995), Medicare (McClellan and Skinner 1997), and elderly tax policy (Nelson 1983)Boskin et al (1987) is one study showing a little progressivity in the OASI system.
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suggest that government policy toward the elderly is neither progressive nor regressive.   Third World
7
Social Security Programs appear to be regressive (Pampel and Williamson 1989, page 10; Midgley
1984).
I.C.  Benefits increase with lifetime earnings
Benefits are typically an increasing function of average annual earnings before retirement.  For
130 out of 139 countries studied by Sala-i-Martin (1996), the pension is linked to his previous wage
history.  In some countries the benefits are simply proportional to the contributions.  In some other
countries (eg., Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden) the
pension has two or even several tiers: a basic pension, usually unrelated to previous contributions,
provides a minimum amount of income for all the elderly.  A second tier relates the pension benefits to
the history of previous wage earnings.
Earnings near to retirement typically count “too much” in the sense that earnings early in one's
working life are not given the extra weight they would be given in a present value calculation.  Some
countries (eg., U.S.) use nearly the entire life history of earnings, giving each year equal weight.  Other
countries (eg., Turkey) only use the very recent earnings history prior to retirement for benefit
calculations.
I.D.  Social Security is financed with special payroll taxes
The vast majority (96.6%) of countries have payroll taxes earmarked for SS (Sala-i-Martin
1996). Some of the payroll taxes are paid by the employer and some by the employee (the relative
importance of each varies widely across countries - see Mulligan & Sala-i-Martin 1999a).  In some
countries an additional share is paid by the government. 
In practice, the fact that SS is financed with a special payroll tax means that SS is financed
through its own special budget. This is a key difference between SS and most other public programs,
which are usually financed through the regular budget rather than through a specific tax.
Of course, tax dollars are fungible so that “earmarking” one tax or another need not have any
economic consequence.  However, it turns out that - both in cross-section and time series - the amount of
revenue collected by payroll taxes is an excellent predictor of the amount of revenue spent on SS
beneficiaries.   We define retirement age as the age at which the person starts collecting SS benefits, whether
8
he actual “retires” -stops working- or not.  As we argued above, in most countries, people start collecting
benefits when they stop working.  
7
I.E.  Benefits are usually, but not always, paid as a life annuity
In most countries and time periods, government old age pensions are paid as a life annuity. 
Benefits begin at retirement age  and are paid in regular intervals (usually monthly) until the beneficiary
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dies.  In many countries, retirees do not have the option of receiving a lump sum payment or to borrow
against their government-backed annuity.  There are a number of exceptions, however, where
governments require or offer the option of receiving all or part of the actuarial value of the annuity in one
lump sum payment.  Many such countries, such as India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, have individual
accounts systems referred to by the SSA as “Provident Funds.”  A few other countries, such as Bahrain,
Egypt, and Mexico’s new system, do not have Provident Funds but nonetheless offer lump sum options. 
Lump sum payments are more commonly paid to survivors or to the disabled.  At least four countries
(Nepal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Vanuatu), require their elderly to take their benefits as a lump sum
(U.S. SSA Programs 1995).
I.F.  Benefits may or may not be payable to emigrants and the institutionalized
Because different theories have different predictions when it comes to whether emigrants and
criminals are allowed to collect pensions, it is interesting to check the facts on whether these two groups
of people are eligible for SS benefits.
Retirees often emigrate from the country where they worked prior to retirement.   Are they
allowed to collect their full pensions if they move abroad? Governments vary according to their rules for
paying public pensions to emigrants.  One fairly common arrangement is for a government to pay full
pensions to retirees immigrating from countries whose governments agree to pay pensions to its emigrant
retirees, although it is only in recent years the U.S. has participated in such agreements (Butcher and
Erdos 1998, pp. 7,11).
Since medical subsidies often take the form of government hospital ownership, government
employment of medical personnel, and other domestic medical subsidies, an emigrant must (when he’s
sick) return to the country where he worked in order to enjoy the full value of his government’s medical
subsidies.  In this sense, medical subsidies are not as generous for emigrants although they may enjoy
medical subsidies financed by the country to which they emigrated.
The earnings test is even tougher for those citizens who emigrate from the U.S. than for thoseSSA Handbook (1997, section 1823).  The two exceptions are: (1) the beneficiary working
9
outside the U.S. is still working in a job covered by U.S. Social Security, and (2) the beneficiary is aged
70+.  In these two cases, the rules for domestic beneficiaries apply.
8
who retire at home - the former group is eligible for benefits only if their monthly work hours are less
than or equal to 45.
9
In the U.S., incarcerated criminals are often not allowed to collect SS benefits. In 1980 the U.S.
ceased payments of disability (DI) benefits to prisoners.  In 1983 it stopped payments of old age and
survivors’ (OAS) benefits to prisoners.  In 1994, it stopped payments of OASDI to the criminally insane
(House p. 35, 100).  
I.G.  Government Retirement Ages have not Risen with Life Expectancy and Health
Life expectancy has risen dramatically over time in the U.S. (Lee 1996, House Committee Table
1-11) and other countries.  For example, the House Committee estimates that, over the history of the SS
program, life expectancy at age 65 has risen 3.5 years (29%) for men and 5.8 years (43%) for women. 
Costa (1998, Chapter 4) reports dramatic 20  century reductions in disease incidence, blindness, and
th
other health indicators among the elderly.  While life expectancy and health among the elderly have risen
over time, the earliest age of eligibility for OAI has fallen.  In the beginning of the program, the earliest
age was 65 for both men and women.  The age restriction for female workers and wives of male workers
was lowered to 62 in 1956.  62 became the early retirement age for men in 1961 (Myers 1993, p. 240)
and, under current law, scheduled to remain at 62 for the indefinite future (House Committee, Table 1-8). 
60 became the early eligibility age for widows in 1965 and later for widowers (Myers 1993, pp. 241-5). 
Holding constant the early retirement age, the “normal retirement age” affects the amount of benefits
available at the early retirement age, but has been constant at 65 throughout the history of the program
(House Committee, Table 1-8).  However, the normal retirement age is scheduled to increase from 65 to
67 over the next 22 years (House Committee, Table 1-8).
Eligibility for permanent disability benefits began at age 65 in the beginning of the program. 
This age was lowered to 50 in 1956 and, effectively, lowered to zero in 1960 (Myers, pp. 239-40).  The
definition of “disability” was also broadened over time (Myers, pp. 238ff).  A result of these and other
changes is a reduction over time in the age of DI beneficiaries (House Committee Table 1-27).
Detailed cross-country comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper, but we believe the same
trends in life expectancy and government retirement ages have occurred in other countries.  For example,
the minimum age of old age pension eligibility under Otto von Bismarck’s 1889 program was 70 (Myers,One study showing this in a sample of 10 countries is Torrey and Thompson (1980).
10
For our purposes, a fully funded system is one which delivers a rate of return greater than the
11
growth of labor income without taxing that income at higher and higher rates.  This definition rules out,
9
1993, p. 264) whereas the current German age is 60 (SSA Programs, 1997).  So-called “unemployment”
and “disability” benefits provide income for retirees younger than 60 to such an extent that the average
age at retirement in Germany is actually less than 60 (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel 1997, pp. 16ff, Figure
IV-1).
I.H.  Governments Finance and Administer Most Old Age Pensions
Most old age pensions systems in the world are administered by the government. Of course, there
are private pensions around the world, but more people are covered by government pensions then by
private pensions.   The importance of the government in the Old Age Pension market contrasts with its
10
lesser importance in other markets such as manufacturing, automobile insurance, to name a couple.
Along with government finance and administration goes compulsion.  The vast majority of “so-
called” contributions to SS systems are compulsory, not made voluntarily by each individual worker.
I.I.  The Public Sector Determines Benefit Formulas
Not only is the government involved with financing and administering pensions, but the amount
of pension to be paid to any individual is determined by a formula which is politically determined, rather
than determined by some non-government institutions.  For example, in the United States, the Congress
and the SS Administration determine how benefits depend on earnings, age, health, marital status, etc. 
Political considerations seem to be an important determinant of the overall level benefits paid to the old,
as pointed out by Diamond (1977, p. 277).
It should be noted that public benefit formulas could very well be determined privately.  The
government could, for example, match public pensions to private pensions dollar for dollar, but this is
almost never the case.
I.J.  Social Security is mostly PAYG and Redistributes Across Cohorts
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) show that the overwhelming majority of the programs (98%)
have pay-as-you-go (PAYG) features.  Of these, a fraction have full-funded much, but not all, of their
program.  This means that most SS programs throughout the world entail intergenerational
11for example, systems like Singapore's "Provident fund" which appears to be a fully funded system but in
fact delivers rates of return to contributors of no more than the rate of labor income growth. A pay-as-you
go system pays retirees according to the labor income taxes levied on the young, which typically means
returns a less than “fair” unless labor income tax rates increase over time.
These are 1989 numbers from IMF (1991).
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redistribution.  In fact, the cross-cohort redistribution is much more important than redistribution in any
other dimension by these programs (e.g., Auerbach et al 1992, McClellan and Skinner 1997, Jensen and
Raffelhuschen 1997, Hagemann and John 1997, House Committee 1996 table 1-50).
Other tax and spending policies favor the elderly, although they may not be advertised as such. 
Many governments, for example, (especially in Europe and countries with high unemployment rates) give
tax breaks and other benefits to firms and older workers who agree to early retirement, with the purpose
of managing the "unemployment problem."  Obviously such taxes and subsidies favor the elderly since
they tend to get “subsidies” to leave their jobs, “pensions” for staying retired, and leisure.
I.K.  Spending on the Elderly Dominates Government Budgets in Developed Countries
Old age subsidies are very important parts of government budgets in developed countries. 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) calculate that nearly 10 percent of U.S. GNP is spent by government
at all levels on those aged 65 and over in the U.S., including Social Security (5% of GDP) and Medicare
(2% of GDP).  Furthermore, American government expenditures on the elderly are smaller relative to
other developed countries.  For example, public pensions represent 13% in Italy, 16% in Sweden, and
20% in Belgium.  Some less developed countries also have large SS programs.  For example, SS
represents 7% of GDP in Brazil.   Even larger shares are computed when medical and other old age
12
subsidies (like housing and even free vacations in Paradise Islands!  New York Times, 1998) are added to
public pensions.
I.L.  Government Regulation Increasingly Favors the elderly
In addition to the taxes and regulation shown on government budgets, there are three areas of
regulation that we might categorize as favoring the elderly or taxing the elderly:
(i) regulation of business, especially environmental regulation
(ii) retirement and disability regulation
(iii) age discrimination laws
A careful analysis of the incidence of regulation (and whether a regulation even promotes its advertised11
objective) is well beyond the scope of this paper, but we might guess that older people own most of the
capital so that regulations that tax current capital and benefit labor are harming mainly the current
elderly.  Perhaps this is especially true for environmental regulations which restrict the operations of
current business and convey benefits decades in the future.
It is unclear whether regulations of type (i) have increased or decreased over time.  Over the last
100 years, it seems clear that the amount of environmental and anti-business regulation has increased
more rapidly than population and probably more rapidly than GNP.  This trend may have reversed with
the massive deregulation around 1980.  Hopkins' (1996) data shows that, while the per capita costs of
environmental regulation have risen 1977-94, the per capita costs of paperwork and price and entry
controls have fallen enough the total per capita cost of Federal Regulation (and perhaps also the portion
of that cost falling on business) may have fallen over the period.  Thus Hopkins' data suggests that the
elderly may have been net gainers from regulation over the period 1977-94.
New retirement regulation and age discrimination laws might be seen as allowing older workers
to renegotiate previous implicit contracts.  Young workers, of course, would like to promise not to
engage in this kind of regulation when they are older but, once they become older and the implicit
contracts are given, the older worker will benefit by renegotiation.  Retirement legislation and age
discrimination laws (eg., the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act and Regulation B of the 1975 Equal
Credit Opportunity Act) have undoubtably increased over time.  On indicator of the increased retirement-
related regulatory activity is the number of Federal District Civil Social Security court cases commenced,
which increased from less than 1% to more than 5% of all Federal District Civil court cases.  Our overall
impression is therefore that the elderly have been net losers from regulation over the long period but net
gainers over the last couple decades.
In sum, business and environmental regulation favors the young, but based on Hopkins’ findings
that business and environmental regulation costs have fallen in the last 20 years and based on our
findings that retirement regulation has increased over time, we enter in Table 1 the “fact” that regulation
has increasingly favored the elderly.  This is obviously a very tentative conclusion but, as we show, a
conclusion which is important for distinguishing among positive theories of SS.
I.M.  Public Pension Programs are found in Democracies and Nondemocracies
Pension programs seem to appear in democratic countries as much as they do in nondemocratic
ones.  One of the very early programs was created in Emperor William's autocratic German state in the
1880s.  Other examples of nondemocratic countries that created such programs are Lenin's USSR inBy SS, we refer Lindert’s “government subsidies to old age pensions.”
13
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1922, King Alfonso XIII's Spain in 1919, Emperor Ito's Japan in 1941, or Kuwait in 1976.  Populist
governments include Argentina under General Peron in 1946 and Mexico under General Avila-Camacho
in 1943.  Democratic examples are the United Kingdom in 1908, Sweden in 1913, or the United States in
1935.
Modern Soviet and Chinese (presumably nondemocratic) pension systems are interesting case
studies.  The Soviet Union 1960-1990 had a system similar to Western European systems, including
retirement at early ages, pay-as-you-go, and payroll taxes (although not “paid by employees”) (Liu 1993,
p. 61).  These basic similarities with American and Western European programs did not change under
Gorbachev and after (Liu 1993, pp. 62ff).  China also has a system for urban workers with a number of
similarities to Western European systems including payroll taxes, benefits based on pre-retirement
earnings, no means test, pay-as-you-go, and probably induced retirement (Tyabji pp. 56-59, SSA
Programs 1995).  Hong Kong (with a very different political system and part of the time a democracy, on
the other hand, has a public assistance program for the elderly rather than an earnings-related public
pension system for nongovernment employees (Tyabji p. 59, SSA Programs 1995).
It is well known that rich countries are more democratic (Barro (1998) is a recent study) and they
devote a larger fraction of their income to SS (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999a is a recent study). 
However, controlling for GDP per capita, Easterly and Rebelo (1993, p. 436) found no relationship
between democracy and SS's share of GNP in their broad cross-country analysis.
Half of the observations were democratic in Lindert’s (1994) panel study of OECD 26 countries
for the years 1880-1930.  Holding constant GDP per capita, the fraction of the population elderly, and
other variables, Lindert finds SS/GDP to vary among democracies according to the voter turnout rate, but
the typical democracy spending the same on SS as the typical nondemocracy.   In their study of 50
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developed and developing nations for the period 1960-75, Pampel and Williamson (1989, p. 102) found
democratic and nondemocratic governments to spending the same on old age pensions once GDP per
capita, the elderly population fraction, and program age were held constant, although they found greater
marginal effects of those variables among democracies.
While the now developed countries were switching to democracy in the XIX and early 20
th
century, the vast majority of SS growth occurred since WWII (Lindert 1994, p. 5).  Hence, our examples
and the econometric studies of Easterly and Rebelo, Lindert, Pampel, Williamson, and Jackman (1975)
all strongly suggest that, controlling for GDP per capita, there are basically no differences in the designEach list presented to the respondents was chosen by a panel of experts which included
14
“members of Congress, professional lobbyists, academics, congressional staff, and pollsters” (p. 158).
However, health care is an important example and results are similar if public health
15
expenditures are reallocated from “other” spending to “social security spending”.
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and amount of SS between the typical democracy and nondemocracy.  Instead, differences in design and
amount are found within democracies and within nondemocracies.
I.N.  Elderly are more single-minded in their politics
The elderly are single-minded in their politics.  The most important concern among elderly voters
are government old age subsidies and is believed by many politicians that the votes of the elderly are
much more elastic to a candidate's stance on old age subsidies than are the votes of any other group to
any other issue.
Fortune magazine recently conducted a poll of 329 Washington “insiders”, “including members
of Congress, their staffs, and senior White House officials” (December 8, 1997, p. 146).  Respondents
were asked to rank the clout in Washington of 120 interest groups, labor unions, and trade associations
and to assess the importance of a list of lobbying techniques.   Two of the three top rated lobbying
14
techniques were “having active allies in a Congressman’s district” and “mobilizing grassroots action,
such as phone calls and letters” (p. 146, italics added).  A successful group has “large numbers of
geographically dispersed and politically active members who focus their energies on a narrow range of
issues” (p. 146, italics added).  The same survey identified the American Association of Retired Persons
as the most powerful lobby in Washington. 
I.O.  Social Security “crowds out” other government spending?
It is not clear whether a greater share of GNP devoted to SS is associated with more or less other
government spending as a share of GNP.  In a cross-section of 57 countries with available data for the
years 1972-90, the correlation between SS/GNP and other government spending/GNP is 0.5.  Some, but
not all, of that positive correlation can be “explained” with GNP per capita (authors calculations using
the IMF Government Finance Statistics and the Penn World Tables).  We conjecture that another part of
it can be explained by the fact that governments spend resources on the elderly without necessarily
referring to those expenditures as public pensions.
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In U.S. history, SS growth has not crowded out other spending but nor has it been associatedCensus Bureau (1998), Table FINC-03.
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with much growth of other government spending.  Government spending on the elderly/GNP at all levels
grew by 8 percentage points over the period 1950-96 while other government spending grew by only 2
percentage points (OMB, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999a Figure 1).  Lindert does find some evidence
suggesting that spending on the elderly crowds out education spending in his panel study of OECD 26
countries for the years 1880-1930.
Other studies have found that the aging of the population is associated with less government
spending on education, which is consistent with the hypothesis that government spending on the elderly
crowds out other government spending.  One example is Poterba's (1997) panel study of U.S. states for
the period 1960-90.
We enter in Table 1 the “fact” that elderly spending crowds out other spending.  This is a very
tentative conclusion because of the contradictory findings with cross-country, time series, and regional
data sets but, a conclusion which is important for distinguishing among positive theories of SS.
I.P.  Pensioners often consume as much or more than do the young
In developed countries, consumption by the old is comparable to consumption of those who have
not retired.  To establish this point, several considerations are necessary.  The first is: (1) the relative
money income of households headed by the old (those age 65+) and those headed by the young.  In 1997,
the elderly-nonelderly ratio of U.S. medians was 0.64 and means was 0.72.   In 1973 (means), 1973
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(medians) and 1981 (medians), the ratios were 0.49, 0.53, and 0.64, respectively (Danzinger et al 1984,
pp. 177-9).
In order to measure consumption per capita, several adjustments are necessary.  To what extent:
(2) do the elderly own larger stocks of household durables and equity?
(3) are different taxes paid by the elderly?
(4) do the elderly head smaller households with fewer children?
(5) can the elderly draw down asset stocks?
(6) do the elderly enjoy in-kind government transfers?
(7) do the elderly have time available for household production or economizing on
market expenditures?
(8) do the elderly avoid job related expenditures?




(10) do the elderly enjoy Medicare and Medicaid as additional consumption?
(11) do the elderly misreport money income?
(12) do the elderly have greater medical needs?
(13) do the elderly miss job-related fringe benefits?
(14) do the poor elderly live with nonelderly households?
Items (2)-(10) suggest that the elderly would consume more when relative money incomes were the same. 
Some research (Radner 1981) suggests that the elderly understate money income in response to census
surveys significantly more than do the nonelderly, so item (11) may also go in the same direction as the
previous items.  Items (12)-(14) are biases in the other direction.
Danziger et al (1984) have quantified items (2)-(4) for 1973, and their results are shown in the
lefthand bar in Figure 1.  The lowest bar reflects the relative reported household cash income from all
sources (including SS) of 0.486.  Accounting for the greater household durables and equity owned by
elderly households suggests that the elderly consume 9 percent more than is indicated by their cash
income and increases the relative consumption estimate from 0.486 to 0.522.  Specially elderly tax
treatment was another 10% of elderly household cash income in 1973, increasing the relative
consumption estimate from 0.522 to 0.562.  Elderly households are significantly smaller than nonelderly
households, although this is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the nonelderly households have children
with lesser “needs” than adults.  The net result is to revise the estimate of relative consumption per adult
from 0.562 to 0.853.  Household composition is their most significant adjustment, although it may not be
the most significant on the list (2)-(14) since the elderly enjoy 61% more leisure time.
1716
Figure 1  American Relative Elderly Adult Consumption, 1973-97
The relationship between income and household size differs between the elderly and nonelderly
population (Danzinger et al, pp. 184), so it matters whether relative incomes are weighted by households
or persons.  The relationship between household income and the propensity to live in a household headed
by someone of a different elderly/nonelderly status also varies with age, so it also matters whether
relative per capita incomes are classified according to the age of the head or assigned to individuals and
then classified according to the age of the individual.  So a final adjustment made by Danzinger et al is to
reweight their 1973 data and compute relative consumption per adult of 0.900 rather than 0.853.
We use Danzinger et al’s 1973 numbers to construct a rough estimate of 1997 relative
consumption.  As computed by the Census Bureau (1998), relative elderly reported cash income has risen
substantially, a finding which we enter in Figure 1 as the lower part of the right-hand bar with heightThere is some direct evidence that elderly federal tax favors have increased substantially over
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time.  Nelson (1983, Table 1) found tax expenditures on the elderly to increase from 1974 to 1982 by
464% in nominal terms and 215% as a ratio to GNP (Council of Economic Advisers)!  Updating
Nelson’s calculations using OMB (1998), we find a decrease of 13% as a ratio to GNP over the period
1982-1997, which implies a net 1974-97 increase of 182% as a ratio to GNP.
If we do the 1997 calculation beginning with the ratio of median elderly family income to
19
median nonelderly family income (0.64), we find the elderly consuming 6% more per adult.
The INSEE (1995) data was kindly provided by Didier Blanchet.
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The excessive generosity of European SS programs can be seen in the fact that, in nearly every
21
European country for which we have 1989 data, the fraction of GDP devoted to publicly provided
pensions equals or exceeds the fraction of population aged 65+.  Note that “publicly provided pensions”
exclude the rest of benefits enjoyed by the elderly (eg., medical).
The first adult (age 15+) is counted as 1 consumer unit, additional adults 0.7, and children 0.5. 
22
Exchange rate from U.S. SSA Programs (1995).
Didier Blanchet, personal correspondence, February 25, 1999.
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0.72.  We then make the conservative assumption that the Danzinger et al adjustments have been
unchanged as a fraction of nonelderly income over the period 1973-97.  This is a conservative
assumption because, presumably, some of the adjustments increased over time together with elderly
money income.   We find elderly consumption to exceed nonelderly consumption by 13% in 1997!   An
18                        19
update and improvement of Danzinger et al’s analysis is certainly appropriate, but it appears difficult to
make the case that the elderly are consuming significantly less than are nonelderly adults.
We believe the old do relatively better in European countries because American public old age
pensions are among the least generous available to citizens of developed countries, and support our
suspicion with data from a French 1995 household budget survey. ,   The survey measures consumer
20 21
expenditures, which we report in Figure 2 as averaged by the age of household head.  The solid bars
graph consumption adjusted for family size and consumption by the INSEE, which we convert to 1995
dollars using an exchange rate of 5.36.   The hollow bars graph unadjusted consumption.  Since the
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majority of French men retire by age 60 (Blanchet and Pelé 1997, Figure 11), it is interesting to compare
the consumption of the groups aged 55-64 and aged 65-74  with that of younger age groups.  We see the
two older groups consuming somewhat more when adjusted for family composition and somewhat less
unadjusted.  It should be noted that the calculations in Figure 2 include housing and durables services
only to the extent that households are paying rent or making mortgage payments.   Presumably both the
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incidence and tenure of French home ownership is highest among older age groups as it is in the U.S., so18
Figure 2  French Consumption Age Profiles, 1995
true consumption is understated most in Figure 2 for the aged.  The biases (6)-(14) are also unaccounted
in Figure 2.
Another indicator of the generous government treatment of the elderly is the poverty rate among
the old as compared to that among children.  Preston (1984) shows how the American old are
significantly better in this dimension and how their advances in this dimension have coincided with the
growth of SS.
The same may be true for undeveloped countries, although data is more difficult to obtain and
the tendency for poor elderly to merge with younger households is probably greater.  D. Gale JohnsonSome of Turner's (1984) specifications suggest that, holding constant other variables, U.S.
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spending per elderly declines with the population fraction elderly over the period 1947-77.  Others of his
specifications suggest the opposite result.  Our unsuccessful attempts to replicate his results suggest that
spending per elderly increases with the population fraction elderly over the period 1947-77 (and over the
period 1947-1995).
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(1998, pp. 2-3) calculates very similar rural incomes per family member across age groups in his study of
the Chinese provinces of Sichuan and Liaoning.
I.Q.  Demographics do not Explain much Spending per Elderly
Changes in government spending on the elderly - as it varies over time or across countries -
cannot be easily accounted for by demographics.  Across countries, we see the fraction of GNP devoted
to SS varying almost exactly one-for-one with the fraction of the population over age 60 (Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin 1999a).  From a “social planner’s” point of view, however, we would expect the fraction of
GDP devoted to public programs for the elderly to increase less than one-for-one because the deadweight
losses associated with SS taxes presumably increase at an increasing rate.
 We can use the pensions received by the Union Army veterans in the 1890s as a starting
reference.  Union Army Pensions amounted to 1.2% of GNP for beneficiaries who were only 1.5% of the
population (Costa p. 162, Census Bureau series HS Y-457, A-7, and F-1) - a ratio of 0.80.  Today’s
government spending on the elderly amounts to 9.4% of GNP and represent a 12.7% of the population - a
ratio of 0.74.
A relationship between demographics and spending per elderly can be seen over the period 1950-
96 in the U.S.  Namely, spending per elderly has increased with the population fraction elderly.  In 1950
the number of citizens aged 65+ was 12.4 million (8.1% of the population) while in 1996, they were 33.9
million (12.8% of the population). The population share of the 65+ has therefore grown by a factor of
1.6.  However, the share of SS in GDP has grown by a factor of 15.6 while the share of all federal
programs devoted to the retired has grown by a factor of 7 and that government spending at all levels has
grown by more than a factor of 5 (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1999a, Table 1, Figure 1).  Hence, the
fraction of GDP devoted to the retirement aged through public programs has grown more over the period
1950-96 than one might have predicted by the evolution of the demographics.
Lindert (1994, p. 28) obtained similar results in his panel study of OECD 26 countries for the
years 1880-1930.   Parsons (1982) found no cross-state relationship between the fraction of the
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population over age 65 and 1930's state old age assistance benefits per beneficiary.20
I.R.  Program size is positively correlated with retirement incentives
In a cross-section of countries, the fraction of GDP devoted to public pensions is positively
correlated with the incentives to retire implicit in benefit formulas. In a cross-section of 55 countries for
the period 1972-90, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) find that countries whose SS benefit formulas
include an implicit 100 percent tax rate devote 3% more of GDP to SS.  Regressing SS's fraction of GDP
in the same cross-section on income per capita, the fraction of the population aged 60 and over, and the
dummy variable for whether SS benefit formulas include an implicit 100 percent tax rate, they find the
coefficient on the dummy variable to be positive and statistically significant (with 2-3% more of GDP
devoted to SS in countries with 100% tax rates); countries with SS programs providing larger incentives
for retirement tend to have larger programs.
I.S.  Program size is positively correlated with economic growth
In cross-sections of countries, the fraction of GDP devoted to public pensions is positively
correlated with per capita income growth.  Sala-i-Martin (1996) regresses per capita income growth in a
cross-section of 74 countries on SS's fraction of GDP, income per capita, public investment's fraction of
GDP, private investment's share of GDP, and government consumption's share of GDP, and finds a
positive partial correlation between the SS variable and economic growth.  Cashin (1995) finds a similar
result following OECD countries over the time period 1971-88.  And, of course, SS and economic growth
are correlated in very long time series because SS and economic growth are both relatively recent
historical phenomena.
I.T.  It is Difficult to Borrow Against Future SS Benefits
It seems to be difficult for a worker to borrow against his future SS benefits.  Perhaps part of the
difficulty is due to government regulation and another part due to reluctance for borrowers to use those
benefits as collateral.  This may be an important difference between SS and government debt, because the
former is difficult to use as collateral while the latter is among the best collateral in the world.
I.U.  Little Evidence for Adverse Selection in Life Insurance and Annuities Markets
Only a subset of the population purchase private life insurance or private annuities.  It has been
suggested that, because of adverse selection, high mortality individuals should purchase life insurance
while low mortality individuals should purchase annuities (eg., Friedman and Warshawsky 1990).  In
fact, those who purchase private life insurance live longer than the general population and there is littleMitchell computes private sector administrative expenses as a fraction of assets; I assume
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benefits to be 10% of assets.
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mortality difference between the population of those with private life insurance and those with private
annuities (Cawley and Philipson 1999).  Furthermore, life insurance premia decline with the size of the
policy rather than increasing (as would be the case when adverse selection led to higher demand for risky
customers; Cawley and Philipson 1999).
I.V.  Government do not Monopolize Many Insurance Markets
Because governments finance, administer, and compel participation in SS, it can be said that they
monopolize annuities, disability, and health insurance markets.  Governments intervene much less in
many other insurance markets such as automobile, fire, and life.
I.W.  Some Private Pension Plans are Administered as Cheaply as Social Security
Some, although not all, private pension plans appear to be administered as cheaply as SS. 
According to Mitchell (1998), Social Security Administration costs are 3.28% of benefits, as compared
to Vanguard’s 2% of benefits and 5%-10% of benefits for 401(k) plans.
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Our interpretation of Mitchell's findings is debatable.  Diamond (1998, pp. 14ff) argues that
administration involves substantial fixed costs per beneficiary and that SSA has more beneficiaries per
benefit dollar, so that SSA's administrative costs per benefit dollar cannot be directly compared to those
of Vanguard or other 401(k) plans.  He suggests that Vanguard or other pension management group
would not manage private pensions for the American labor force as cheaply as does SSA.
II.  Positive Theories of Social Security: Political or Efficiency?
Theories of SS can be partitioned into two broad categories: political theories and efficiency
theories. Political theories view SS as redistribution, the outcome of a political struggle.  Two or more
groups of citizens fight (politically) to extract resources from each other and, if a theory predicts the
elderly’s winning the fight, it becomes a SS theory.  There are two main ways to model the political
battle: voting models and pressure group models.  
We categorize as efficiency those theories identifying market inefficiencies and explain how a SS
program might be created to alleviate them.  Typically, although not always, these theories explain why it
must be the government who administers a SS program. For example, a theory may argue that the market22
fails to provide a certain kind of insurance for the elderly so that the government needs to step in. 
Sometimes, the theory shows why SS of the kind we observe is the optimal way to eliminate the
inefficiency.  Sometimes it is only shown that SS partially alleviates the problem.
It is interesting to notice that, even though there are many examples of both political and
efficiency arguments, theories within these two basic groups share a number of characteristics and
predictions.  Before going into detailed descriptions of particular theories, we describe these broad
common characteristics. The findings are summarized in Table 1.
One characteristic shared by all purely political theories of SS is that the outcomes of political
struggles are likely to be economically inefficient.  Hence,  these theories suggest that there are SS
reforms which may increase welfare.  The problem is that the same theories tend to predict that SS
reform may not be feasible without political reform.  In contrast, to the extent that they argue that SS is
the optimal policy to combat some kind of market malfunction, efficiency models will tend to predict that
SS reform is less likely to increase welfare.
Another prediction shared by all political models is that other dimensions of government activity
- such as regulations and mandates - should also favor the elderly (if, through whatever political means,
the elderly are powerful enough to get a SS program, they should also be powerful enough to get other
political benefits such as regulation favoring them).  This prediction is not shared by efficiency models.
Some political theories are built upon explicit game theoretic political models (for example, a
median voter model).  These models tend to predict that the amount and type of redistribution is highly
sensitive to the form of the game.  Hence these models will tend to be inconsistent with the similarity of
programs across countries with very different political institutions (even across democracies and
nondemocracies).  Efficiency models do not explain how large groups of individuals make collective
decisions.  This is both of virtue and a drawback of the efficiency approach.  On one hand, an explicitly
political model could generate refutable predictions about the relationship between political activity and
SS.  On the other hand, the efficiency approach suggests that the design of SS depends more on economic
considerations than political considerations (presumably, the inefficiency that the SS is trying to correct
appears in all economies, regardless of their political system), a suggestion which is consistent with the
finding that democracies and non-democracies have similar SS programs (holding constant economic
variables).
In political models, it is only natural that benefits be paid as an annuity rather than a lump sum
(an annuity is just the recurrence of lump sums!) and that fewer benefits be paid to nonparticipants in the
political process, such as emigrants and the institutionalized (this is why we decided to investigate23
whether giving benefits to these individuals was a fact shared by many SS programs or not).  It is tougher
for a political model to explain why benefits are payable to emigrating retirees, as they are in some
countries. 
As long as the old are “winners” (and they usually are in models that try to explain SS!), a
political model is also consistent with more consumption per old, and SS crowding out other spending.
This contrasts with efficiency models which do not identify "losers" from policy, so they do not predict
SS crowding out other government spending or that there should be additional legislation favoring the
elderly.  Efficiency stories make no prediction as to whether the old should consume more or less than
the young.
Finally, political theories predict SS results in redistribution from young to old (that is what the
political struggle is all about!), while efficiency theories do not necessarily make this prediction.  It
would therefore seem the political models are either: (1) inconsistent with the kinds of intergenerational
linkages assumed by Barro (1974), or (2) inconsistent with self-interested political activity on the part of
many of the young and old.24
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In addition to these common features, within the two main groups, different theories make
different predictions. We now introduce simplified analyses of each of the theories, describe their
particular predictions and contrast them with the facts that we described above and with other facts
which may be interesting.
We divide the political theories into two groups: theories of majority rational voting and theories
of pressure groups.  This last category, in turn, includes two types:  the time-intensive political
competition and taxpayer protection model.   We identify eight efficiency theories: welfare for the
elderly (or optimal redistribution), internalizing human capital spillovers, SS as “Retirement” Insurance,
solving the Prodigal Father problem, misguided Keynesian, SS as Longevity Insurance, government
economizing on transaction costs, and human capital investment finance.
There are some theories which are neither “political” nor “efficiency”.  Because these theories
are not formalized in the literature, we label them “Narrative Theories”.  Narrative theories include the
“Chain Letter”, “Lump of Labor,” “Monopoly Capitalism,” and the “Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal PolicyAccording to the United Nations, the four oldest countries in the world were Monaco, Italy,
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Greece, and Sweden with 71, 78, 78, and 78 percent of their population under age 60, respectively.
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Response to Private Pensions” models.  Because of the lack of mathematical models, we limit our
comparison with the other theories.
In Section III of this paper, we discuss the various political theories in detail and we compare
them with the empirical regularities highlighted in the previous section.  In a companion paper (Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin 1999b), we discuss the efficiency as well as the narrative theories of SS.
III. Political Theories of Social Security Compared
III.A  Majority Rational Voting
One simple way to model SS is to have the elderly be the winners of a political battle where the
“prize” is a pension.  It is common to model public decisions in democratic regimes as the outcome of a
majoritarian election among rational voters who vote in their self-interest.  The typical result is that the
median voter makes the public decision.  Before we start discussing the creation of a SS program that
benefits the elderly with a median voter model, we need to point out that, in the real world, the voter of
median age is NOT a retiree but a taxpaying worker.   
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Hence, it is immediately obvious that median voter models need some modification before they
can be applied to SS.  Two modifications have been proposed in the literature: (1) for the old to form a
coalition with another group, and (2) have one election to choose a stationary policy for all time, perhaps
under the threat of punishment from the unborn.  We review those approaches below and show which
facts are consistent with the theory and which facts are not.
III.A.1  The Old as Leaders of a Winning Coalition
Given that the elderly are not the majority of voters, one thing they can do to enact a SS program
which benefits them is to ally themselves with other groups of voters so as to form a majority coalition. 
Tabellini (1992) takes this approach and argues that the old form a coalition with the poor to support a
policy taxing the losers of the political battle: the young and the rich.  
This approach has a number of interesting predictions. It explains why SS programs are run by
the government and why SS crowds out other types of government spending.  It is also consistent with
the fact that SS benefits are unrelated to whether the beneficiary is disabled and with the fact that26
benefits take the form of annuities.
The theory also predicts that the size of SS increases with the fraction of the population that is
elderly and with income inequality.  The size of SS does not seem to be positively correlated with the
amount of income inequality, especially once a measure of economic development is held constant
(Tabellini 1992 Table 3.  See also a vast literature on the lack of positive correlation between income
inequality and the size of government, including Peltzman (1980) and Benabou (1996)).
Another problem with Tabellini’s story is that the young poor are the majority of Tabellini’s
hypothesized majority coalition.  Those aged 65+ are 13% of the U.S. population (Council of Economic
Advisers).  They are a larger fraction of voters, but still not 25% of them and hence a minority of any
majority coalition.  Even in two aged countries with substantial elderly voter turnout - Sweden and
Germany - those aged 65+ are only 22% and 33% of voters, respectively.  So we expect the young poor
to be gaining as much or more from SS as do the old.  Instead it is not even clear whether the young poor
are net beneficiaries from social security, and there is no question that SS does more redistribution across
age groups than across income groups (see section (I.J) above).
Another faulty prediction of Tabellini’s model is that, since the winning coalition includes the
poor, SS should tend to be progressive (and generate redistribution between the rich and the poor).  Our
section I.B explains how studies of who pays taxes and who receives benefits under American and third
world SS have found little progressivity - and maybe even regressivity.  And, under the hypothesis that
the poor are the least interested in saving for retirement, it is likely that the poor are worse off under SS
(Mulligan and Philipson 1999).
Since the old and the poor have teamed up in Tabellini’s model it is possible to have a positive
correlation between government spending on the poor and government spending on the old.  In other
words, it need not be the case that government spending on the old crowd out other government spending
although it should crowd out spending that is neither on the old or the poor.
Tabellini’s model also fails to explain why SS (implicitly) taxes the labor income of the elderly
since it models the old as winners in the election and does not explain why the winners have to tolerate
implicit taxes or forced retirement.  Nor does it explain why SS benefits are an increasing function of
past earnings and are independent of labor income.
The fact that the coalition of old-plus-poor is the winning coalition is simply an assumption and
it is left unexplained.  It is just as reasonable that alternative winning coalitions would include the middle
aged, the rich, or some other group.  In other words, why do the old-plus-poor win rather than the young-
plus-middle class? Or the young-plus-females?In a sense, the “once-and-for-all election” is a special case of “elderly leaders of a winning
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coalition.”
The young would oppose with slightly positive interest and discount rates because the rate of
28
return they would get on the SS deal would be 0 and they would forgo the rate r>0 (the money they pay
to the old could be invested at the rate r), but the policy would still attain the winning coalition of the
27
Nor is it clear why the old-poor coalition would be a stable one, especially given that SS
programs redistribute such large amounts and do so with such little progressivity.  With so much at stake,
what stops the young from offering even higher benefits to the very poor in exchange for their agreeing
to vote against - and defeat - SS?
III.A.2  A Once-and-for-all Election
A second way to have the elderly win a majority vote given that they are a minority of the voters
is for them to form a coalition with the middle aged.   For example, a program might be set up that, even
27
though it hurts the middle aged in the short run, benefits them in the long run because, eventually, they
will become old.
Browning (1975) considers a model in which there is one election to decide a policy for all time.
The key assumption is that only stationary policies are candidates for the election.  He shows how the
proposal to create a SS wins the election.  He also shows that if the election were to be held again
sometime in the future, the outcome would be the same stationary policy.  Hence, he argues that the
assumption of only considering permanent SS programs in the model is justified. We reproduce a
simplified version of his overlapping generations model here.
There are three generations of equal size:  young, middle age, and old.  Each generation lives for
three periods. There is no population or economic growth.  The discount rate and interest rate are zero
(we make this assumption to simplify exposition so that the present values of all future SS benefits and
payments can be easily calculated).  The three groups must vote on the introduction of PAYG SS
program which will last forever.  The proposal is the following: in each period beginning with the current
one, the young and middle aged will pay taxes in the amount T and the old will receive a subsidy of size
2T.  Notice that, with this policy, the middle aged pay T today and gain 2T tomorrow, which represents a
net gain of T so they would favor this policy.  The old pay nothing and gain 2T so they also vote in favor. 
The young break even in present value since they pay T for two periods and get benefits 2T in one period
so they do not oppose the policy.  Hence, this policy would win an election if its opposition were no
policy at all.   Since it wins an election now, Browning argues, there is no reason to worry that the
28middle aged and old.  See Browning (1975) for a proof with nonzero discount rates and positive
economic growth.
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policy would lose an election later an hence it is reasonable to assume that the policy is permanent. 
This theory shares with Tabellini’s some of the predictions which are met in the data.  However,
it also shares many of Tabellini’s problems. For example, it does not explain why SS programs in the real
world systematically induce retirement (through heavy implicit taxes on the old or through mandatory
retirement): since Browning views the old as winners in the election, he cannot explain why the winners
have to tolerate implicit taxes or forced retirement.  In other words, the winning old should not be
penalized for working in his model - while in fact they are. The model also fails to explain why SS
benefits are an increasing function of past earnings, why SS is financed with special payroll taxes, why
retirement age does not increase with the wealth or the life expectancy of a country, or why the benefits
per elderly are not related to the share of elderly in the overall population.
An additional theoretical problem with this model is that it is not clear whether Browning’s
agents should rationally anticipate that a SS program would be continued.  Browning’s argument does
not hold if  nonstationary policies come up for election in future period t.  For example, consider a
temporary suspension of SS for one period (we suspend SS today, but we will reinstate the system next
period).  Those young and middle aged in period t gain T since they get a period off from paying, and
they will still get 2T when they become old.  Hence, they both vote in favor of a temporary suspension.
Although those who are old today lose their pension, 2T, and they vote against, temporarily suspending
SS still wins the election when run against the policy of continuing SS.
In order to avoid the possibility that future elections temporarily suspend SS thereby
withdrawing the support of the current middle aged for continuation, Kotlikoff et al (1988) suggest that
each generation is deterred from supporting such a policy because the unborn “threaten” to do the same
in response in future periods.  In response to this amendment, let us simply mention that, as with other
applications of the Folk Theorems, there are a great many sustainable subgame perfect equilibrium and
the Kotlikoff et al approach gives little help in choosing one among them.  Most importantly, the old are
still seen as “winners” from the SS system so it is unexplained why that very system heavily penalizes
the old for working.
That voting occurs is crucial for both versions of the voting model.  Hence, the models predict
that SS policy would be significantly different if citizens did not vote on policy or on the individuals who
determine policy, as they do not in nondemocracies.  This prediction finds no support in a sizable29
empirical literature in economics, sociology, and political science.  It is difficult to see any differences in
the design and amount of SS between the typical democracy and nondemocracy once the level of
economic development or the population age distribution is taken into account.  Instead, differences in
design and amount are found within democracies and within nondemocracies, apparently determined by
factors unrelated to whether or not citizens vote on policy.
It has also been pointed out (eg., the work reviewed by Tullock 1998) that policies are not
decided by majority rule in the U.S. and most other countries.  First, representatives (not policies) are
elected in general elections, and sometimes not by majority rule.  Second, a policy is not even decided by
majority rule among the representatives, who vote instead on a large collection of policies.  Third,
representatives vote multiple times and clearly trade votes with each other, and by this and other
mechanisms intensity of preference can be expressed in ways not possible in the median voter model. 
Perhaps these are defects of Tabellini's model, but we believe the main tests lie in explaining what
policies are adopted by governments rather than the details of how the adoption occurs.
We are unaware of anyone using either version of the voting model to explain why governments
try to prevent borrowing against future SS benefits, while at the same time borrowing using government
bonds as collateral is quite easy.
III.B.   Time-Intensive Political Competition
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999a) model a political competition between the young and old. 
They argue that an important input into the competition for each group is the time allocation of its
members.  To put their hypothesis simply, groups whose members work less are more successful.  One
important justification for this assumption is that, if people do not work, then the amount of political
issues they have to worry about is smaller so they can concentrate their efforts on “getting a pension or a
transfer from the other group”. In other words, retired people are more single minded than non retired
workers.
Of course, groups face a free rider problem because an individual member does not fully account
for the effects of his time allocation decision on his group's success.  If the group could make each
individual's decisions collectively and costlessly, each member would work less than he would choose on
his own. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin suggest that such costlessly collective decision making is not
available, so, instead, pressure groups favor policies which discourage their members from working.  One
such policy is government tax and benefit formulas depending on the beneficiary’s work effort.  If work
effort cannot be observed and hence cannot be used as part of the tax and benefit formulas, then theThe use of earnings histories as a proxy for elderly labor productivity also explains why
29
earnings near to retirement count as much or more than earnings early in life, especially relative to a
present value calculation.
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appropriate policy is to tax earnings -- with more earnings reducing benefits (or increasing taxes) and
proxies for productivity (defined to be the ratio of earnings to work effort) such as past earnings
increasing benefits.   Furthermore, the implicit and explicit tax rates may be as high as 100 percent.
29
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin argue that the old lobby has the greater incentive to reduce its
members work effort and hence face the highest (implicit) tax rates.  One reason for the greater incentive
is that the old are less productive than the young.  Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin also point out that, while
current policy can certainly be changed in the future, a large social security program today makes it at
least a little tougher for future governments to have a small program (and easier to have a bigger
program).  The young know this and hence have less incentive to resist the old and thereby less incentive
to lobby for higher implicit tax rates on their members.
As both the result of facing higher implicit tax rates and because they might retire for other
reasons, the old enjoy relatively more leisure and, in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin’s model, are net
beneficiaries from the political process.  Their model thereby explains transfers across cohorts, explicit
labor income taxation of the young, implicit labor income taxation of the old, nonlinear and even 100
percent taxes, the dependence of benefits on preretirement earnings, the lack of means-testing, and why
programs with stronger retirement incentives are larger.  Since the opportunity cost of time is relatively
low for the old in a growing economy, the model also explains the positive correlation between SS and
economic growth.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin also predict that other low wage groups will face relatively high
implicit tax rates and, to the extent that lower wages lead to greater leisure, those groups will be net
gainers from the political process.  However, unlike the old who enjoy relatively little resistance because
the young anticipate becoming old, other low wage groups are likely to encounter substantial resistance
from their opposition because there is relatively little switching from high wage to low wage groups. 
Another difference between the old and other low wage groups is an unproductive elderly person may not
be poor (because he was productive earlier in life and saved for old age) and thereby able to afford
retirement whereas low productivity may be more of a permanent situation in the lives of members of
other low wage groups.  Hence, while Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin predict some leisure and political
success by the poor, more leisure and success is enjoyed by the old.
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin's model is a pressure group model, as is the model of “TaxpayerIn countries where benefits are reduced continuously with beneficiary earnings, lenders may be
30
willing to lend to workers using the sum of their old age earnings and benefits as collateral since the sum
would not reduce with their work decision.  Such an arrangement would not work in countries that
withhold all benefits from any elderly person who works, even if his earnings fall short of the benefit
amount.
31
Protection” below.  Pressure group models are about conflicts among groups, conflicts which we expect
to arise regardless of the details of the political institutions within which those conflicts occur.  Hence
both a weakness and a strength of the pressure group approach is that it does not have much to say about
the details of political activity (this is a weakness) but it can address conflicts arising in a variety of
political settings and relate public decisions to economic variables rather than political variables (this is a
strength).  Related to this, we have entered as a note in Table 1 that the pressure group models of SS are
consistent with no systematic difference between SS programs in democracies and nondemocracies.
Suppose a worker were to borrow against his future SS benefits.  When he reached old age, he
would have a stronger incentive to work than those who did not borrow because the latter give up
benefits by working. The former also gives up benefits, but that is the problem of his lender who
effectively has purchased those benefits.  Because allowing borrowing increases the incentive for the old
to work, the old lobby would be against it unless they had another means to discourage their members
from working.  Furthermore, lenders would be unwilling to lend to a worker using his SS future benefits
as collateral unless that worker could also credibly give up his future rights to work.
30
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin do not endogenize the size of the young and old groups, and hence do
not offer any mathematical comparative statics for the retirement age. .32
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Table 2: More Facts, Theories of Social Security, and Implications for Reform
Positive Theories: Political Efficiency
Social Security in Practice
Old Age Benefit Formulas
a  d e c l i n i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  l a b o r  i n c o m e NYYYYYYNNYN
often involve 100% labor income tax rates NYYNYNNNNYN
n o n l i n e a r  t a x  r a t e s ,  b u t  s o m e  t a x a t i o n  o f  e v e n  v e r y NYn a YNn a n a NNYN
high labor income
n o  a s s e t  t e s t s NYNNYNNNNYN
a n  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  l i f e t i m e  w a g e NYn a NYYNNYYY
proof of disability usually not required YYYYYNYYYYY
usually paid as annuity Y Y na na na na Y na Y Y N
s o m e t i m e s  p a i d  a s  l u m p  s u m N N n an an an aN n aN n aY
r e t i r e m e n t  a g e  n o t  r i s i n g  w /  h e a l t h ,  l i f e  e x p e c t Nn a n a NNNn a Yn a YY
Other
SS a government program YYYYYNYYNYN
S S  f i n a n c e d  w i t h  p a y r o l l  t a x e s NYNNYYNNYYN
SS “crowds out” other government spending YYYYNNYYNNN
b e n e f i t  p e r  e l d e r l y  u n r e l a t e d  t o  e l d e r l y  p o p .  s h a r eNn a Nn a NYYn a n a YN
e v e n  s m a l l  e l d e r l y  p o p u l a t i o n s  b e n e f i t NYYYYYYNYYY
s i z e  ( + )  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  r e t i r e m e n t  i n c e n t i v e s NYNn a YYNn a n a NN
s i z e  ( + )  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h YYn a YYNNNn a n a Y
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b o r r o w  a g a i n s t  f u t u r e  S S  b e n e f i t sNYYYYYYNNYN
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III.C.  Taxpayer Protection
Becker and Mulligan (1998) show that inefficient taxes and subsidies may be an effective way to
reduce the size of the government as it reduces the incentives for lobbies and pressure groups to expand
public programs.  Using this reasoning, one could argue that the seemingly inefficient subsidy schemes
we observe in real life SS programs are meant to protect taxpayers from the excessive pressure of those
subsidized.
We present here an abbreviated version of the derivation by Becker and Mulligan 1998. Consider
a simple model of competition for political power between the young and the old.  Assume that the
government has a balanced budget, and the political competition results in the young being taxed T, to
finance equal subsidies to the old.  Hence, T is the size of the SS program.  In order to win the political
game, both groups may spend resources (to lobby legislators, influence voters, etc. to persuade them to
vote to keep taxes relatively low or subsidies high.)   The young spend the amount Y and the old spend O. 
Unlike the Mulligan/Sala-i-Martin (1999a) model discussed in the previous section, these resources are
not time intensive.
This approach merely assumes a reduced form function F that is the end result of what may be a
very complicated process of electoral voting, legislative decisions, executive branch initiatives or perhaps
some complicated process of political influence in a non-democratic regime.  In this reduced form, the
size of the transfer from the young to the old (that is, the size of the SS program) directly depends on the
amounts spent by Y and O on gaining political influence:
T = Taxes Paid by Young= Benefits Enjoyed by the Old = F(O/Y)
with F1(O/Y) > 0,  F2(O/Y) < 0
More pressure by the old increases the size of SS while more pressure by the young decreases it.  Both
pressures run into diminishing returns.  In order to simplify the analysis, we have assumed that it is only
the ratio of pressures applied by the two groups that determines the transfer from one group to another.
The Problem for the Young
The number of young is 1-￿.  The young taxpayers’s group chooses their spending in the political
game, Y, with the objective of minimizing the total cost of the political process.  The total cost has three
components.  First, if the young end up losing the political battle, they will have to pay F to the old. 




￿ ￿(T/(1￿￿)) ￿ Y
1￿￿
O
Y2 F￿(O/Y)[ 1￿￿ ￿( T /(1￿￿))] ￿ 1
34
behavior in order to reduce tax payments, they will incur in a deadweight cost (dwc).  In particular,
taxpayers substitute the consumption of untaxed goods for the consumption of taxed goods, reducing
their tax liability but leaving them with a consumption bundle which they would not demand in the
absence of taxation.  Hence, the per member dwc of taxes is itself a function of the amount transferred
per member T/(1-￿).   We denote the dwc function by ￿(T/(1-￿)) and we assume it to be increasing and
nonconcave, ￿1 ￿ 0, ￿2 ￿ 0.  The tax system and the nature of the economy determine the form of this
function.
The young group chooses Y so as to minimize the total cost per group member, taking the total
spending of the old, O, as given:
where T  =  F(O/Y).  The first order condition for this problem is:
The Problem for the Old
The number of old people is ￿.  The old lobby chooses their spending in political activities, O, in
order to maximize the difference between the subsidies or SS benefits it receives and the costs it has to
pay in order to get these benefits.  The subsidies received are equal to T.   The costs have two
components.  The first is the direct spending on lobbying, O. The second cost is the dwc of the subsidy
per group member, which we denote by (.  Subsidies also have a dwc because the old change their
behavior in order to obtain the subsidy.  The most important practical instance of this is the reduction in
labor supply.  ( depends on the amount subsidized per old, T/￿, and we assume ((#) is increasing and
nonconcave, (1 ￿ 0, (2 ￿ 0.  The subsidy system and the nature of the economy determine the form of
the function (.








F ￿(O/Y)[ 1￿( ￿( T / ￿ )] ￿ 1
O
Y
￿ 1 ￿ (￿(T/￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿(T/(1￿￿))




where T  =  F(O/Y).  When making their decision, the old take the spending of the young, Y, as given. 
The first order condition for this problem is:
We assume that the government budget is determined as a Nash equilibrium of a "game" between
the two pressure groups.
The Political Equilibrium Comparative Statics
Dividing the first order conditions of the young and the old, we can obtain an implicit formula for the
ratio O/Y:
If we use the pressure function, T=F(O/Y), we can rewrite this expression as an implicit function of the
size of the social security program, T:
Remember that the details of the tax and subsidy systems determine the shape of the functions ￿ and (,
respectively.  In particular, less efficient SS benefit formulas mean a larger (1 for any given amount to be
paid to the old.  It follows from the formula that less efficient SS benefit formulas decrease pressure
applied by the old, decrease the size of SS, and make the taxpayers better off.  Hence, we expect the36
young to favor SS policies with large marginal dead weight costs such as distortions of elderly work
decisions.
Another correct prediction of Becker and Mulligan’s taxpayer protection model is that
government intervention is required to maintain a SS system and that, while older populations have more
aggregate spending on the elderly (dT/d￿ > 0), even small elderly populations may enjoy substantial per
capita benefits.  Indeed, the model may go too far in this regard because it predicts that benefits per
beneficiary decrease with the fraction of the population that is old (d(T/￿)d￿ < 0; see Turner 1984 for
another proof).
Like any model in which SS benefits decrease with the beneficiary’s labor income, it seems
natural that lenders would be unwilling to lend to a worker using his SS future benefits as collateral.
Becker and Mulligan can explain why SS transfers might not be lump sum, but notice that the
reason taxpayers favor more distortionary transfers is in order to limit the size of the program.  This
predictions seems contrary to Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin’s (1999a) empirical finding that SS programs
with the greatest work disincentives are the larger rather than the smaller programs in the world.
Another problem is that Becker and Mulligan simply assume that there is a group of net
taxpayers.   It is not at all clear that the winning group ought to be the elderly.  Hence, although this may
be a good theory of  intergenerational (or inter-group) transfers, it does not explain why the transfers are
from young to old rather than from old to young.
Becker and Mulligan do not endogenize political group membership and hence have little to say
about retirement age (which partitions the population into the young and old groups).
IV. Conclusions 
We explore a number of empirical facts which can help identify the forces creating and
sustaining SS programs.  We also compare the common characteristics of “political” theories with those
of “efficiency” theories.  Finally, we discuss the three main political theories of SS: the rational median
voter model, the labor-intensive political pressure model and the taxpayer protection model.  A
companion paper (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b)) discusses efficiency theories and “narrative
theories.”  Finally, the companion paper uses each of the political and efficiency theories to evaluate the
desirability of "reforming" pay-as-you-go SS by replacing it with a forced savings program.  Perhaps
surprisingly, those theories most consistent with the empirical regularities are those in which forced
savings is a rather undesirable policy, even in the long run.37
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